

Securing Internet Routing: RPKI

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Fakrul is responsible for the development and delivery of technical training to the APNIC community and works closely with network operating members in the Asia Pacific region. His specialist training areas include Routing & Switching, Network Architecture, Network Security & Management and Network Forensics.

Prior to joining APNIC, Fakrul worked for several organizations which includes IXP, ISP, Financial Institutes. He has strong knowledge of, and operational experience in building and deploying scalable, reliable network infrastructure.

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Bei (Jessica) Wei

Training Officer

After graduating from China's Huazhong University of Science and Technology in 2007 with a degree in electronics engineering, Bei (whose nickname is Jessica) joined Huawei as a network training officer.

Over the next six years, she provided Huawei technical training on LAN/WAN systems, broadband access, IP core and IP mobile backhaul networks as well as working on technical training course design and the development of IP training materials. At the Huawei training center in China she provided technical training to engineers and administrators from more than 15 nations including Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Pakistan and Bangladesh.




Email: jwei@apnic.net

Purpose of RPKI


- RPKI replaces IRR or lives side by side?
 - Side by side: different advantages
 - Security, almost real time, simple interface: RPKI
- Purpose of RPKI
 - Is that ASN authorized to originate that address range?

AS Path

2001:DB8::/32	65551	65550	65549	i	VALID
2001:DB8::/32		65552	65536	i	INVALID



RPKI Deployment



Internet Registry (IR) / RIR

- Maintains Internet Resources such as IP addresses and ASNs, and publish the registration information
 - Allocations for Local Internet Registries
 - Assignments for end-users
- APNIC is the Regional Internet Registry(RIR) in the Asia Pacific region
 - National Internet Registry(NIR) exists in several economies

The Eco-System



Internet Assigned Numbers Authority



Regional IR (RIR)



National IR (NIR)



Internet Service Provider



End User

Goals of RPKI

- Able to authoritatively prove who owns an IP Prefix and what AS(s) may Announce It
 - Reducing routing leaks
 - Attaching digital certificates to network resources (AS Number & IP Address)
- Prefix Ownership Follows the Allocation Hierarchy IANA, RIRs, ISPs, ...

Advantage of RPKI

- Useable toolset
 - No installation required
 - Easy to configure manual overrides
- Tight integration with routers
 - Supported routers have awareness of RPKI validity states
- Stepping stone for AS-Path Validation
 - Prevent Attacks on BGP

RPKI Implementation


- Two RPKI implementation type
 - **Delegated**: Each participating node becomes a CA and runs their own RPKI repository, delegated by the parent CA.
 - **Hosted**: The RIR runs the CA functionality for interested participants.

Two Components


- Certificate Authority (CA)
 - Internet Registries (RIR, NIR, Large LIR)
 - Issue certificates for customers
 - Allow customers to use the CA's GUI to issue ROAs for their prefixes
- Relying Party (RP)
 - Software which gathers data from CAs

Issuing Party

- Internet Registries (RIR, NIR, Large LIRs)
- Acts as a Certificate Authority and issues certificates for customers
- Provides a web interface to issue ROAs for customer prefixes
- Publishes the ROA records



Relying Party (RP)



Software which gathers data from CAs
Also called RP cache or validator

RPKI Building Blocks

1. Trust Anchors (RIR's)
2. Route Origination Authorizations (ROA)
3. Validators

1. PKI & Trust Anchors

Public Key Concept


- **Private key:** This key must be known only by its owner.
- **Public key:** This key is known to everyone (it is public)
- **Relation between both keys:** What one key encrypts, the other one decrypts, and vice versa. That means that if you encrypt something with my public key (which you would know, because it's public :-), I would need my private key to decrypt the message.
- Same as http with SSL aka https

RPKI Profile


X.509 Certificates 3779 EXT

Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [PKIX]. They also contain an extension field that lists a collection of IP resources (IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses and AS Numbers) [RFC3779]

Signed by Parent's Private Key



Trust Anchor



Source : <http://isoc.org/wp/ietfjournal/?p=2438>

RPKI Chain of Trust

- The RIRs hold a self-signed root certificate for all the resources that they have in the registry
 - They are the trust anchor for the system
- That root certificate is used to sign a certificate that lists your resources
- You can issue child certificates for those resources to your customers
 - When making assignments or sub allocations

2. ROA

Route Origin Authorizations

Route Origination Authorizations (ROA)

- A ROA is a **digitally signed object** that provides a means of **verifying** that an **IP address block holder** has **authorized** an **Autonomous System (AS)** to originate routes to one or more **prefixes** within the address block.
- With a **ROA**, the **resource holder is attesting** that the **origin AS** number is **authorized to announce** the **prefix(es)**. The attestation can be verified cryptographically using RPKI.


Route Origination Authorizations (ROA)

- Next to the prefix and the ASN which is allowed to announce it, the ROA contains:
 - A minimum prefix length
 - A maximum prefix length
 - An expiry date
 - Origin ASN
- Multiple ROAs can exist for the same prefix
- ROAs can overlap

3. Validators

Origin Validation

- Router gets ROA information from the RPKI Cache
 - RPKI verification is done by the RPKI Cache
- The BGP process will check each announcement with the ROA information and label the prefix



Result of Check

- **Valid** – Indicates that the prefix and AS pair are found in the database.
- **Invalid** – Indicates that the prefix is found, but either the corresponding AS received from the EBGP peer is not the AS that appears in the database, or the prefix length in the BGP update message is longer than the maximum length permitted in the database.
- **Not Found / Unknown**– Indicates that the prefix is not among the prefixes or prefix ranges in the database.

Valid > Unknown > Invalid

ROA Example

Prefix: 10.0.0.0/16
ASN: 65420

ROA	65420	10.0.0.0/16	/18
	Origin AS	Prefix	Max Length
VALID	AS65420	10.0.0.0/16	
VALID	AS65420	10.0.128.0/17	
INVALID	AS65421	10.0.0.0/16	
INVALID	AS65420	10.0.10.0/24	
UNKNOWN	AS65430	10.0.0.0/8	

Local Policy

- You can define your policy based on the outcomes
 - Do nothing
 - Just logging
 - Label BGP communities
 - Modify preference values
 - Rejecting the announcement

In summary

- As an announcer/LIR
 - You choose if you want certification
 - You choose if you want to create ROAs
 - You choose AS, max length
- As a Relying Party
 - You can choose if you use the validator
 - You can override the lists of valid ROAs in the cache, adding or removing valid ROAs locally
 - You can choose to make any routing decisions based on the results of the BGP Verification (valid/invalid/unknown)

RPKI Caveats

- When RTR session goes down, the RPKI status will be not found for all the bgp route after a while
 - Invalid => not found
 - we need several RTR sessions or care your filtering policy
- In case of the router reload, which one is faster, receiving ROAs or receiving BGP routes?
 - If receiving BGP is match faster than ROA, the router propagate the invalid route to others
 - We need to put our Cache validator within our IGP scope

RPKI Further Reading


- RFC 5280: X.509 PKI Certificates
- RFC 3779: Extensions for IP Addresses and ASNs
- RFC 6481-6493: Resource Public Key Infrastructure

RPKI Configuration


RPKI Configuration

- Resources:
 - AS : 131107 [APNICTRAINING-DC]
 - IPv4 : 202.125.96.0/24
 - IPv6: 2001:df2:ee00::/48
- Process
 - Create ROA
 - Setup cache validation server
 - Validate the ROA

Implementation Scenario



Phase I - Publishing ROA



- Login to your MyAPNIC portal
- Required valid certificate
- Go to Resources > Certification Tab

Phase I - Publishing ROA

The screenshot displays the APNIC RPKI administration interface. It is divided into three numbered steps:

- Step 1:** The 'Certification' menu item in the top navigation bar is highlighted with a red circle and the number 1.
- Step 2:** The 'Enable Resource Certification' section shows two radio button options. The first option, 'I want to operate in the MyAPNIC RPKI portal.', is selected and highlighted with a red circle and the number 2. A green 'Next' button is visible below the options.
- Step 3:** The 'Terms and Conditions of APNIC Certification Authority' section is shown. A blue button at the bottom, labeled 'I accept. Create my Certification Authority', is highlighted with a red circle and the number 3.

The interface also includes a breadcrumb trail: Home / Resources / RPKI.

Phase I - Publishing ROA

- Show available prefix for which you can create ROA

All		Items per page 10	Search by AS or IP..
<input type="checkbox"/>	Origin AS	<input type="checkbox"/>	Prefix
<input type="checkbox"/>	131107	<input type="checkbox"/>	2001:df2:ee00::/48
<input type="checkbox"/>	131107	<input type="checkbox"/>	202.125.96.0/24

Phase I - Publishing ROA

ROA Configuration

Origin ASN Prefix Max Length

1. Write your ASN

2. Your IP Block

3. Subnet

4. Click Add

- Create ROA for smaller block.

All Changes Items per page 10

Origin AS	Prefix	Max Length	
17821	2406:6400::/32	32	
131107	2001:df2:ee00::/48	48	
45192	203.176.189.0/24	24	

Showing 1 to 3 of 3 entries

Certified Resources

61.45.248.0/23

61.45.251.0/24

61.45.253.0/24

203.176.189.0/24

2001:DF0:A::/48

2406:6400::/32

Phase I - Check your ROA

```
~ [?] D/A/R [?] RPSL-DEMO [?] master [?] whois -h whois.bgpmon.net 202.125.96.0/24
% This is the BGPmon.net whois Service
% You can use this whois gateway to retrieve information
% about an IP address or prefix
% We support both IPv4 and IPv6 address.
%
% For more information visit:
% https://portal.bgpmon.net/bgpmonapi.php

Prefix:                202.125.96.0/24
Prefix description:    APNICTRAINING-DC
Country code:         MN
Origin AS:            131107
Origin AS Name:       ASN for APNICTRAINING LAB DC
RPKI status:          ROA validation successful
First seen:           2016-06-21
Last seen:            2016-08-03
Seen by #peers:       248
```

Phase I - Check your ROA

```
whois -h whois.bgpmon.net " --roa 131107 202.125.96.0/24"  
0 - Valid  
-----  
ROA Details  
-----  
Origin ASN:          AS131107  
Not valid Before:    2016-06-22 05:00:07  
Not valid After:     2020-07-30 00:00:00 Expires in 3y360d1h32m3.79999998211861s  
Trust Anchor:        rpki.apnic.net  
Prefixes:            202.125.96.0/24 (max length /24)
```


Phase II - RPKI Validator

- Download RPKI Validator
 - <http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/certification/tools-and-resources>

Tools and Resources

Here you can find an overview of all information and tools for the Resource Certification (RPKI) service.

RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 2.21 (Updated 3 November 2015)

This application allows operators to download and validate the global RPKI data set for use in their [BGP decision making process](#) and [router configuration](#).

[Download Now](#)

System requirements: a UNIX-like OS, Java 7, rsync and 2GB free memory. To install, simply unpack the archive and run "rpki-validator.sh" from the base folder.

For more information, [view the release notes](#). You can also [contribute to the project on GitHub](#).

Phase II - RPKI Validator

```
# tar -zxvf rpki-validator-app-2.21-dist.tar.gz  
# cd rpki-validator-app-2.21  
# ./rpki-validator.sh start
```

Phase II - RPKI Validator

http://ip_address:8080

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist BGP Preview Export and API Router Sessions

Quick Overview of BGP Origin Validation

```

    graph LR
      TA[Trust Anchors] --> ROAs[ROAs]
      ROAs --> IF[Ignore Filters]
      IF --> W[Whitelist]
      W --> R[Router]
  
```

Trust anchors are the entry points used for validation in any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system.

This RPKI Validator is preconfigured with the trust anchors for AFRINIC, APNIC, Lacinic and RIPE NCC. In order to obtain the trust anchor for the ARIN RPKI repository, you will first have to accept their [Relying Party Agreement](#). Please refer to the README.txt for details on how to add trust anchors to this application.

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist BGP Preview Export and API Router Sessions

Configured Trust Anchors

Enabled	Trust anchor	Processed Items	Expires in	Last updated	Next update in	Update all
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APNIC from AFRINIC RPKI Root	15 0 0	3 years and 3 months	2 hours ago	11 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APNIC from ARIN RPKI Root	68 0 0	3 years and 3 months	2 hours ago	11 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APNIC from IANA RPKI Root	1621 0 0	3 years and 3 months	2 hours ago	12 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APNIC from LACNIC RPKI Root	6 0 0	3 years and 3 months	2 hours ago	11 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APNIC from RIPE RPKI Root	27 0 0	3 years and 3 months	2 hours ago	11 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AfrNIC RPKI Root	162 0 2	2 years and 4 months	2 hours ago	11 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LACNIC RPKI Root	1498 0 0	7 years and 8 months	2 hours ago	12 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RIPE NCC RPKI Root	6768 0 0	4 years and 10 months	2 hours ago	19 minutes	<input type="button" value="Update"/>

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist BGP Preview Export and API Router Sessions

Router Sessions

This table shows all routers connected to this RPKI Validator. Requests and responses are described in [RFC 6810](#). For debugging, please refer to rtr.log.

Remote Address	Connection Time	Last Request Time	Last Request	Last Reply
103.12.177.222:54057	2014-07-20T15:24:44+06:00	2014-07-20T16:02:47+06:00	SerialQuery	EndOfDataPdu

RIPE NCC Copyright ©2009-2014 the Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre RIPE NCC. All rights reserved. Version 2.17

Phase III - Router Configuration

1. Establish session with RPKI Validator

Junos

```
set routing-options validation group RPKI session 202.125.96.46 refresh-time 120
set routing-options validation group RPKI session 202.125.96.46 hold-time 180
set routing-options validation group RPKI session 202.125.96.46 port 8282
set routing-options validation group RPKI session 202.125.96.46 local-address 103.21.75.1
```

IOS

```
router bgp 64500
  bgp log-neighbor-changes
  bgp rpki server tcp 202.125.96.46 port 8282 refresh 120
```

Phase III - Router Configuration

2. Configure policy to tag ROA

Junos

```
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term valid from protocol bgp
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term valid from validation-database valid
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term valid then local-preference 110
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term valid then validation-state valid
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term valid then accept

set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term invalid from protocol bgp
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term invalid from validation-database invalid
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term invalid then local-preference 90
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term invalid then validation-state invalid
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term invalid then accept

set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term unknown from protocol bgp
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term unknown from validation-database unknown
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term unknown then local-preference 100
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term unknown then validation-state unknown
set policy-options policy-statement ROUTE-VALIDATION term unknown then accept
```

Phase III - Router Configuration

2. Configure policy to tag ROA

IOS

```
!  
route-map ROUTE-VALIDATION permit 10  
  match rpki invalid  
  set local-preference 90  
!  
route-map ROUTE-VALIDATION permit 20  
  match rpki not-found  
  set local-preference 100  
!  
route-map ROUTE-VALIDATION permit 30  
  match rpki valid  
  set local-preference 110
```

Phase III - Router Configuration

3. Push policy to the BGP neighbour

Junos

```
set protocols bgp import ROUTE-VALIDATION
```

IOS

```
router bgp 64500  
  bgp log-neighbor-changes  
  !other neighbour related configuration  
  neighbor 10.1.1.2 route-map ROUTE-VALIDATION in
```

Check your prefix

Junos

```
rpki-rtr>show route protocol bgp 202.125.96.46/24
202.125.96.0/24      *[BGP/170] 3w5d 16:57:33, MED 0, localpref 100
                    AS path: 3333 4608 131107 I, validation-state:
verified
                    > to 193.0.19.254 via xe-1/3/0.0
```

IOS

```
rpki-rtr>show ip bgp 202.125.96.0/24
BGP routing table entry for 202.125.96.0/24, version 70470025
Paths: (2 available, best #2, table default)
  Not advertised to any peer
  Refresh Epoch 1
  3333 1273 4637 1221 4608 131107
    193.0.19.254 from 193.0.3.5 (193.0.0.56)
      Origin IGP, localpref 110, valid, external
      Community: 83449328 83450313
      path 287058B8 RPKI State valid
```


Commands

Command (Junos)	Description
<code>show validation session detail</code>	Check session status of cache validator server
<code>show validation statistics</code>	Statistics on valid/invalid prefixes
<code>show validation database</code>	Full validation database
<code>show route protocol bgp validation-state valid/invalid/unknown</code>	Find valid/invalid/unknown routes

!Caution!

```
18:26:21 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp ' 18:26:34 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp ' 18:27:55 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp ' 18:29:20 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp rpki table ' 18:29:31 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp rpki servers ' 18:29:34 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
CMD: 'show ip bgp rpki table ' 18:29:49 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
```

```
Exception to IOS Thread:
Frame pointer 0x7F3A8AA51EE0, PC = 0x8DA4DA
```

```
UNIX-EXT-SIGNAL: Segmentation fault(11), Process = BGP Router
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 :400000+4DA4DA :400000+73AB56B
400000+4980EA :400000+4A64DD :400000+496ED5
```

```
Fastpath Thread backtrace:
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 c:7F3B7C28C000+BDDDD2
```

```
Auxiliary Thread backtrace:
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 pthread:7F3B774EB000+A7C9
```

```
RAX = 0000000000000008 RBX = 00007F3A8AA520A0
RCX = 8039F30F00000000 RDX = 0000000000000000
RSP = 00007F3A8AA51EE0 RBP = 00007F3A8AA51FE0
RSI = A020A58A3A7F0000 RDI = D8803CB53A7F0000
R8 = A020A58A3A7F0000 R9 = 00007F3A853C80D8
R10 = 00007F3A83A6B221 R11 = 0000000000000001
R12 = 00007F3A853C80D8 R13 = 00007F3A8AA52110
R14 = FFF7000600000000 R15 = 00007F3A8AA52094
RFL = 0000000000010293 RIP = 00000000008DA4DA
CS = 0033 FS = 0000 GS = 0000
ST0 = 0000 0000000000000000 ST1 = 0000 0000000000000000
ST2 = 0000 0000000000000000 ST3 = 0000 0000000000000000
ST4 = 0000 0000000000000000 ST5 = 0000 0000000000000000
ST6 = 0000 0000000000000000 ST7 = 0000 0000000000000000
X87CW = 037F X87SW = 0000 X87TG = 0000 X87OP = 0000
X87IP = 0000000000000000 X87DP = 0000000000000000
XMM0 = A81F718A3A7F00009802598A3A7F0000
```

18:20:34 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014

```
show ip bgp ' 18:27:55 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
show ip bgp ' 18:29:20 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
'show ip bgp rpki table ' 18:29:31 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
J: 'show ip bgp rpki servers ' 18:29:34 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
MD: 'show ip bgp rpki table ' 18:29:49 BDT Mon Mar 17 2014
```

```
Exception to IOS Thread:
Frame pointer 0x7F3A8AA51EE0, PC = 0x8DA4DA
```

```
UNIX-EXT-SIGNAL: Segmentation fault(11), Process = BGP Router
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 :400000+4DA4DA
400000+5BF6C4 :400000+5BCAD5 :400000+4980EA :400000+4A64DD :40
```

```
Fastpath Thread backtrace:
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 c:7F3B7C28C0
```

```
Auxiliary Thread backtrace:
-Traceback= 1#270a78af3c82800fb448b5d32a66d575 pthread:
```

```
RAX = 0000000000000008 RBX = 00007F3A8AA520A0
RDX = 0000000000000000
RBP = 00007F3A8AA51FE0
RDI = D8803CB53A7F0000
```

Testbed

- **Cisco (hosted by the RIPE NCC)**
 - Public Cisco router: rпки-rtr.ripe.net
 - Telnet username: ripe / No password
- **Juniper (hosted by Kaia Global Networks)**
 - Public Juniper routers: 193.34.50.25, 193.34.50.26
 - Telnet username: rпки / Password: testbed

Configuration - Reference Link

- **Cisco**

- http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/iproute_bgp/command/irg-cr-book/bgp-m1.html#wp3677719851

- **Juniper**

- http://www.juniper.net/techpubs/en_US/junos12.2/topics/topic-map/bgp-origin-as-validation.html



www.apnic.net/roa

Thanks